In the beginning was the word: paradigms of language and normativity in law, philosophy and theology by Yovel, Jonathan
Mountbatten Journal ofLegal Studies
In the Beginning was the Word: Paradigms
of Language and Normativity in Law,
Philosophy, and Theology
Jonathan Yovel
'And God said let there be light and there was light.' 1
Genesis 1:3
'When I say "I do" (sic take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife) I am
not reporting on a marriage, I am indulging in it. '
J L Austin, Performative Utterances
Introduction
What, as lawyers and speakers, do we do with words? What are the
modes of language used in legal argumentation (and in litigation in
particular), and how can they be studied and analysed according to functional
I My translation differs somewhat from the King James Version (1611) ('And God said, Let there be light: and
there was light') as well as from the New American Standard Bible (1971) ('Then God said, "Let there be light";
and there was light'). The original Hebrew text contains no punctuation nor quotation marks to signify a
subordinate clause (although it does feature a unique system of emphases for oral reading); also, the word 'then' -
framing time and sequentiality - does not appear in the original, whose six-word, fifteen-syllable-long structure
forms a much tighter temporal phrase. Though dissimilar, this rendition is actually closer to the awkward
formulation with which Young's Literal Translation (1898) struggles, ('And God saith, "Let light be;" and light
is.') See also the New International Version (1978) and the Revised Standard Version (1952) ('And God said,
"Let there be light"; and there was light').
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linguistic analyses developed by philosophers of language and by linguists,
while grounded in culture? This article, cursorily and with no claim to
exhaustiveness, attempts to delineate, trace, and reconstruct the main features
of three interacting language paradigms significant in legal practice and
theory: rhetoric, representationalism, and performativity. The examples
discussed are narratives of institutionalised and customary law that share
linguistic attributes with literary forms and theological puzzles.
These and related questions presented themselves in different guises to
thinkers as various as those of philosophy's hellenic inception and the authors
of biblical narratives. Happily, language springs from culture and history
rather than presupposes it, which furnishes as good as any an opportunity to
begin this inquiry.
Rhetoric v Representation: Some Preliminaries
Socrates: [T]he aspiring speaker needs no knowledge of the truth about
what is right or good... In courts of law no attention is paid whatever to the
truth about such topics; all that matters is conviction... Never mind the truth -
pursue probability through thick and thin in every kind of speech; the whole
secret of the art of speaking lies in consistent adherence to this principle.
Phaedrus: That is what those who claim to be professors of rhetoric
actually say, Socrates.
Plato, Phaedrus
Perhaps the most intellectually engaging - as well as politically potent
and morally outrageous - approach to language in the classical world was the
rhetorical paradigm, taught by such formidable sophists as Gorgias and
Protagoras.2 According to this paradigm, the language most common and
most effective in social interactions - notably in politics and in litigation - is
persuasive language ('rhetoric' is used somewhat narrowly in this article for
2 This article employs the term 'rhetorical paradigm' in the narrowest sense where it means an array of techniques
for effectively mastering social language, primarily through persuasion, or language's ability to serve as a
manipulative agent.
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the sake of making a precise point). Language is not and cannot be
representational, as Socrates (and much later, Aquinas, Leibnitz and the early
Wittgenstein) thought, and what's more important, representation of non-
linguistic things - a cow in a meadow, an emotion, good and evil - is simply
not the point about using language. Rather, the game of language is that of
manipulating hearers to act in ways conforming with the speaker's interests.
A linguistic interaction is first and foremost manipulative, and all the rest -
conveying thoughts, making people laugh, representing facts (or states-of-
affairs or what have you), must be interpreted in view of the general
principle. Gorgias himself, a sceptic in matters epistemic, claimed that even if
we do - by accident - stumble across some "truth" we could not convey it to
others, not as a matter of competence but because of language's inherent
shortcomings in representing anything extra-linguistic. In other words, before
all else comes politics: the formation of society and manipulation within it
through language, as an instrument of power, an exercise of the will. What
one does with language is inducing people to act in certain ways - such as
side with one in a debate, rule in one's favour, obey one's commands, etc.
This is not a cynical view, because it does not follow that language
masquerades as civic virtue, because the rhetorical capacity to effectively
master language is civic virtue. Gorgias could have given as an example of
effective manipulation of persuasive language the great anti-sophist himself,
Socrates, a consummate performer of the persuasive arts masquerading in
unavoidable representations of 'truths'. Language, claimed the sophists, has
no inherent dependency on any non-linguistic metaphysics and its use is
therefore independent from any concept of knowledge, except for that of
rhetoric itself.
In the middle-middle ages the understanding of language as rhetoric, was
all but sidelined - as a scholastic approach - by a naturalistic paradigm,
which aspired to perfect - as humanly possible - representation in all matters
'natural', including the normative and the legal, which medieval philosophy
considered not as matters given to social construction or convention, but
primarily as matters of factual truths of universal, divine validity. Thus
according to Thomas Aquinas' monumental Summa Theologica rules of law
are natural much in the same way that the rules of the physical world are, and
both kinds share the same divine source. They are to be discovered rather
than created, inferred from the eternal law of divine origin rather than
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constructed.3 Law is not about power but about justice and the common
good, and language - as used by correct political institutions - is for
effectively applying and translating these metaphysical abstractions into civic
and political practice. Inference, let us recall, is that narrative mode that
pertains to guarantee that all that is present in a given argument's conclusion
- in this case, propositions of human law - follows from the premises, namely
natural law (being itself that subset of the eternal law that is subject and
available to rational inquiry). Nevertheless, Aquinas' jurisprudence leaves
room for contingencies, for construction, for internalizing context, and even
for arbitrariness, as human law must apply - by ways of coordination,
determination, and application - to factual contingencies. For instance, from
natural law's sanction of the sanctity of life we infer that people must not be
exposed to undue hazards, but whether this requires that motorists drive on
one side of the road or the other is a question no inference can answer. Such
action must be coordinated - that is what matters, not the regulation's
specific content.4 And while justice, perhaps, requires that litigants be granted
rights of appeal, it has little to say concerning the exact length of the appeal
period - a question of determination - although it perhaps does dictate a
contextual 'domain of reasonableness', ideally formed as an equilibrium of
the respective interests of review and of res judicata.
However, can language be trusted to fulfil its representational function?
The Renaissance's Francis Bacon grieved that to a large extent it doesn't, and
would require a sort of radical purification in order to succeed. More than a
means of understanding, language was an impediment: it imposed its own
cultural biases, vocabulary and equivocal systems of meaning on our world-
view in a manner that veils the world and obscures our perception. Kant
would later speak of epistemological categories which are necessary,
constitutive postulates of reason, but Bacon sought to rid science from 'the
idols of the market', as he termed pre-purified representational language in
his search for perfect systems of representation and communication.5
3 Thomas Aquinas, 'Treatise on Law' in Summa Theologica, Benziger Br~s; New York, 1947 SP QQ 90-95.
4 Raz J, 'Authority, Law and Morality', 1985,68 Monist 295
, Bacon F, Novum Organon, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1855, 1620. Bacon sought to retrieve pure
representationalism from its contaminated cultural forms by way of a purification method he termed 'induction'
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Leaping a good historical distance and unpardonably overlooking much
of what we pass by (such as Spinoza's use of multi-layered rhetoric,
simultaneously conveying meanings on different levels to savants and to the
multitudes, and Leibnitz's Characteristica Universalis which purported to
delineate a perfect representational language and a "calculus of truth") we
come to meet with representationalism as it is confronted by the emerging
question of power. Friedrich Nietzsche, the enfant terrible of western
philosophy, developed a philosophy (or 'psychology', after his own
appellation) according to which the 'will to power' is the fundamental
ontological fact, and language is an instrument in the service of the will's
necessity to act in a social world, to exercise power over others.6 Even when
representational, Nietzsche saw language as culturally constructed and
subject topragmatic needs. It stems from two interconnected concerns: a
survival-and-attainment interest that depends on classifications,7 and
communication.8 Classifications, Nietzsche argues, are both artificial and
mistaken - but not arbitrary, and useful as such: they serve practical needs,
such as distinguishing a class of edible articles from poisonous ones. As such
the 'truth' ofclassifications is irrelevant, indeed it must typically be ignored.
Language is not about correctly representing the world but about laying
the foundations for action (in the "reversal of values" terms of the will to
power, contrary to both utilitarianism, Christianity, and its secular offshoots
of deontological approaches to ethics). This position should also be
distinguished from pragmatism, because Nietzsche regarded our reliance on
and dependence upon linguistic classifications as a fault, a weakness, that a
new psychology could overcome.
It is intriguing to observe in Nietzsche's discussion of communication a
clear precursory affinity to the later Wittgenstein. Language, Nietzsche
claims, is to be seen first and foremost as a social, public phenomenon. It
(which has nothing to do with the common use of the tenn). On the history on the quest for the perfect
representational language see Eco U, The Perfect Language. Blackwell, Oxford, 1995.
6 Nietzsche also argued that nothing valuable can be expressed in language because all deepness is individual,
while language evolved as a social communicative device for the masses, thus becoming resistant to significant
refinement. Nevertheless, he didn't seem to think that his expressible theses were valueless. Coming to tenns -
or not - with contradictory claims is a henneneutic necessity when reading Nietzsche.
7 Nietzsche F, The Gay Science, trans Walter Kaufinann, Vintage Books, New-York, 1974, 355.
'Ibid 354.
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develops and lives in the social sphere (as opposed to the private). For sure, it
is representational in that it serves to communicate content to others; but
communication in the first place is a medium for the will to act in the world -
it frames the social world of action. Thus language is rhetorical and
performative first, and representational only instrumentally, with little
concern for 'truth' and subject to its primary functions.
The Pre-Critical Age: Representationalism in the early 20th Century
Alice felt dreadfully puzzled. The Hatter's remark seemed to have no
sort of meaning in it, and yet it was certainly English.
Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
In the 19th and 20th centuries, the positivist and the Marxist movements
have seeded change even within the parameters of the representational
paradigm. In the latter approach especially, the vocabulary of social
explanation shifted from the natural to the cultural to artificial, constructed
reality. As for the 20th century so-called 'logical positivists', the problem of
representation became acute. They thought of natural sciences, and physics in
particular, as a model of all valid knowledge: a-historical (sometimes
misleadingly termed 'analytical') propositions capturing empirically-
verifiable (or later, falsifiable) regularities about those aspects of the world
that may be thus represented. Such an approach inevitably centred around the
question, how is representation - and even 'perfect representation' - possible,
and what are the conditions for it? This question was paramount for the
positivists as much as it was for the early Wittgenstein, who answered it to
his complete (yet transitory) satisfaction in the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus where segments oflanguage are viewed as 'pictures' of reality
and a sentence, rather than referring, 'shows' its meaning. Hence,
Wittgenstein wrote 'A proposition is a picture of reality. A proposition is a
10
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model of reality as we think it to be'.9 No other approach, Wittgenstein
argued, could explain how speakers understand sentences they have never
encountered, let alone form them (from a different approach, this problem
was later settled by Chomsky's theory of generative grarnmar).IO Likewise,
sentences or propositions cannot be explained, because every explanation
merely puts forth another sentence, or proposition; they can only be 'shown'.
Wittgenstein's friend G E Moore recounts how, when Wittgenstein was a
soldier in trenches of the First World War, he came upon an old magazine
that contained an illustration that represented a car accident - a fact -
pertaining to a lawsuit. It occurred to Wittgenstein that in the same manner a
proposition represents, or 'pictures', in the vocabulary of the Tractatus,
states-of-affairs.
The 'picture theory' features representationalism at its height.
Interestingly, note Wittgenstein's inclination toward epistemological idealism
expressed by pictures pertaining not to the world 'as it is' but 'as we think it
to be,' where 'think' should take on the wider sense of cogitum, but - in
contrast to Descartes - in a collective plural tense rather than the monologic
singular. We have not dealt with epistemology directly here, yet it is
important to emphasize that representationalism does not imply naive realism
nor linguistic transparency: it does not imply that we have access to the world
'as it really is', to the impenetrable ontological something that Kant called
'the thing in itself. Even in the relatively early Tractatus Wittgenstein
effectively tells us that as states-of-affairs are accessible only linguistically,
our ways and manners of devising schemes of representation will preempt
any possible knowledge of the world, or at least of those components of the
world that are given to representation in the first place.
The logical positivists and the so-called 'Vienna Circle' were greatly
influenced by the 'picture theory'. It helped them form the positivist postulate
of representation, which is to ground it in some conception of meaning.
Reiterating Alice's concern, they asked which segments of language are
9 Wittgenstein L, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans GEM Anscombe, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1922,4.031; see also 2.1-2.1512, 2.1513-3.01, 3.42, 4.01-4.012, 4.021, 4.03-4.032, 4.06, 4.462'3, 5.156, 6.341-2,
6.35.
10 Chomsky N, Syntactic Structures, Mouton, The Hague, 1957.
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meaningful, and which not. Their solutions converged on propositions, or
statements, subject to the so-called 'verifiability principle' that, in a nutshell,
claims that for a proposition to be meaningful it must be either analytic (ie
tautological, 'the ball is round') or empirically verifiable (or, as was later
substituted by Popper, falsifiable, 'the ba11 is red').ll Using verifiability as a
meta-semantic criterion for distinguishing meaningful propositions from
nonsense, the logical positivists who introduced it proposed thus to dispense
with many traditional philosophical questions as 'pseudo-problems', for no
conceivable proposition that would seek to represent any answer for them
could conceivably be empirically verifiable - eg, propositions of
transcendental ethics. 12
Different authors argued for different levels of force for the verifiability
requirement. Waismann, representing that part of the Vienna Circle that
originated the concept, stated the principle that a proposition that is not
verifiable conclusively is not so at all, and thus meaningless; it is the aim of
philosophy (although not its sole aim) to purge all discourse of such talk. 13
" Analytic propositions are those whose truth-value is inherent. Typically, in subject-predicate sentences, this
means that the predicate is contained in the concept of the subject, ie •balls are round'. Analytic sentences are
thus conceived to be non-informational (mathematics pose a special category). Their truth value is given-a-prior,
so experience plays no role in determining it. Non-analytic, or synthetic statements, are informative and generally
- again with the exception of mathematics - a-posteriori: "balloons are yellow". For a seminal rejection of the
analytic-synthetic dichotomy in favour of a 'net' of relatively-synthetic sentences (but not strictly analytic ones)
see Quine W V, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in From A Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass, 1961, p 20.
'Empirical verifiability' is a contingent characteristic of synthetic propositions that refers to some conceivable (not
necessarily actual) means of verifYing by recourse to experience pertaining to the predicative argument. Thus
'balloons are yellow' is not emphirically verifiable because it makes a claim about all balloons, including those
that are inaccessible, such as balloons that do not yet exist.
12 It is relevant to the discussion of rhetoric to note logical positivists' treatment of ethics, a subject on which they
held no general view. While all rejected transcendental ethics, the status of normative statements was left unclear.
Perhaps the most representative view is that held by Carnap and Ayer. Propositions of ethics, they argued, are not
empirical assertions ('it is wrong to steal' is not an empirical assertion about stealing) but rather expressions of
emotions about stealing or, in a different context, an attempt to dissuade ourselves or others from stealing (in
Austinian terms, it is a perlocutionary utterance). See Ayer A J, Language, Truth and Logie, 2nd edn rev,
Gollancz, London, 1946.
13 Waismann F, 'verifiability', in Flew A (ed), Articles on Logic and Language, Blackwell, Oxford, 1951, 117.
Although nothing is 'proved' in philosophy (as opposed to science, nevertheless Waismann actually depended on
philosophy to supply 'deeper insights' into various aspects of coguition and human experience; the view that
philosophy was only a critique of language, an instrument for 'dissipating fogs' he ridiculed as 'only criticism
and no meat' and wrote that 'while logic constrains us, philosophy leaves us free', in 'How I see Philosophy', in
Ayer A J (ed). Logical Positivism, The Free Press, New-York, 1959, p 354.
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This extreme formulation received as much critique from within the school as
from without. It excludes every universal statement, statements about
experiences of others, etc; it even has the odd effect that the opposite ofmany
meaningful propositions (whether true or false), instead of being of the
opposite truth value, is meaningless.14 And even more annoyingly, the
application of the verifiability principle to itself created the obvious problem
that as a proposition it is obviously not analytical, nor is it in any conceivable
way empirically verifiable. 15
Philosophically, logical positivism has since lost much of its appeal as
a theory ofknowledge, as the very concept ofknowledge shifted from
analytical to historicist and sociological terms. 16 Nevertheless, it still seems to
appeal to 'common-sensical' approaches and retains some of its attraction, if
not for many philosophers, then at least for quite a few scientists and a
considerable body of lawyers - especially those preoccupied with projects of
proper demarcations of 'legal' propositions as opposed to propositions only
masquerading as such while being expressions of moral or political
commitments.
In view of the next linguistic paradigm to be discussed - performativity
- it may not be misplaced to warn from confusing the early Wittgenstein with
the logical positivists. What they shared, and where they both erred -
according the performative paradigm - was not just their approach to meaning
as in the assumption that language is only a system of representations, a
14 For instance, the proposition 'there are golden things' (3x)(Gx) is empirically verifiable, hence meaningful
(and, as it happens to be, true to date) but the proposition 'there are no golden things" -(3x)(Gx) or (ltx)(-Gx) is
not verifiable and hence, rather than being false is nonsense. Popper's falsifiability principle overcomes some of
these problems, see below n IS.
IS Different treatments from within the school were offered to remedy this. Of the two main ones, Popper offered
to substitute a falsifiability principle for the verifiability one ("a proposition is acceptable if it is, in principle,
empirically falsifiable"). Note, that Popper kept emphasizing that the falsifiability principle be interpreted not as a
criterion for meaning, but only as a demarcation criterion for discerning "scientific" propositions from other ones
(such as metaphysical, religious, etc.). See K Popper, The Logic ofScientific Discovery Harper & Row, London,
1959, C01yectures and RefUtations, Harper & Row, New York, 1965. From a different direction, Ayer proposed
the adoption of a weaker verifiability principle that settles for a degree ofprobability rather than conclusiveness.
See A J Ayer, above n 12. For a collection of works by logical positivists and thinkers who influenced them see
Ayer, above n 13.
16 A movement that generated much of its thrust from Thomas S Khun, The Structure OfScientific Revolutions,
University ofChicago Press, Chicago, 1970.
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thesis that J L Austin dubbed "the descriptive fallacy"Y Austin attacked
logical positivism both by systematically developing the notion of 'doing'
things with non-representational 1, as well as by invoking rhetoric, a class of
'things which, treated as statements, were in danger of being dismissed as
nonsense' by the positivists as they are 'intended not to report facts but to
influence people in this way or that.'\8 Latter-day critics frequently remark
that "many writers... in linguistics and the social sciences... have assumed
that referential communication [a kind of representational talk - JY] is the
only function of language".\9
In view of legal theory we must note an important position shared by
the early Wittgenstein and the logical positivists, as it influenced several legal
positivists: the view of the world as the 'totality of facts' .20 The legal
relevance is that, accordingly, as long as norms are inhabitants of the (social)
17 See Austin, below n 36, at p 234 and passim. By this time Wittgenstein's posthumous Philosophical
Investigations was already published, in which the 'picture theory' is rejected and partially replaced by the
'meaning as use' theory (which Austin criticised for other reasons).
18 Austin, Ibid.
19 Judith Irvine, 'When Talk isn't Cheap: Language and Political Economy', 12 American Ethnologist (1989) 214-
235.
20 On most other accounts Wittgenstein is wrongly confused with logical positivism. Specifically, Wittgenstein
never subscribed to the positivists' views on verifiability as a criterion for meaningfulness nor to empiricism, and
the TLPH doesn't deal with these concepts at all. Also, contra the positivists' project, the TLPH should not be
regarded as an anti-metaphysical work. Rather, it views language as limited in such a way that it cannot represent
metaphysical insights; but this is (possibly) a thing to regret, and (certainly) a starting point for other ways of
achieving those insights - which Wittgenstein called 'mystical' and that 'make themselves manifest' (TLPH
§6.522) - rather than giving them up. The TLPH concludes with this famous proposition: "About what we cannot
speak, we must be silent."(TLPH §7. This translation is preferable, for obvious reasons I think, to Pears and
McGuiness's "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." An intentional silence is quite the
opposite of 'passing over'.) It is an intentional silence, a silence that asserts the existence of a realm of things
non-expressible by language but perhaps not less significant. Nowadays few, if not altogether none, post-
'linguistic tum' philosophers hold that cognition of any sort can be nonlinguistic, or that anything our minds may
form is inexpressible in language. This latter claim is sometimes called the 'principle of expressibility', according
to which 'whatever can be meant can be said'; see John Searle, Expression and Meaning, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1979, p 134 reiterating Searle, below n 35, Durnmett's attention is turned more generally to
thought:
It is ofthe essence of thought, however, that it is transferable, that I can convey to you exactly what I am
thinking... I do more than tell you what my thought is like - I communicate to you that very thought.
Michael Dummett, 'Frege's Distinction between Sense and Reference', in Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, \978, p 116. On this question, personal introspection may inform us differently.
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world, they must also be considered and treated as (social) 'facts'. This is a
position relevant to the seminal jurisprudential question that Richard Posner
paraphrased as 'legal ontology' - whether law is all just a matter of facts, or
can it not be properly conceptualised without recourse to normative
categories that are not social facts (such as ethics or, under some
understandings, interpretation and application). The relation of linguistic
theory to this and other jurisprudential questions must be treated elsewhere.
The Linguistic Turn
Perhaps more than any other streak of thought, thinking about language
in the 20th century has been influenced and challenged by what became
known as the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy and later in anthropology and
linguistics. The fundamental idea was again Wittgenstein's. In its most basic,
the linguistic tum is a thesis concerning how we know and construct the
world as a product of cognitive activity. The mind's instrument is language:
thinking, cogitating 'about' the world is done in language and in language
only - there is no thought without word. 'About' here is parenthesized,
because the linguistic turn's concept of 'world-language' denies the mutual
independence of language and world, thus the one cannot, strictly speaking,
be merely 'about' the other; 'aboutness' is no longer a relation between
presupposed entities and must be reinterpreted as formative rather than
representational in the positivistic sense. The reason this matters is that
language is not a neutral, or 'transparent' device through which thought and
cognition travel intact. Our thoughts are shaped by the device that is available
to them, the language in which they occur. Our propositions, even if they
purport to represent a non-linguistic reality, are linguistic. We have no direct,
non-linguistic access to truths 'about' the world (physical or social or
normative). What we cannot say we cannot know, let alone communicate.
According to the more extreme branches of the linguistic turn, the world and
all its attributes and phenomena - physical and social - are constructions of
linguistic cultures, committed not only to such things as the limits of
15
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linguistic structure but also to language's ideology and thematic character.21
As the founder of modem linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure, remarked, the
very notion of linguistic meaning depends on differentiation of signs, i e, on
variance ('apple' is different from 'pear' as a matter of the English language,
not horticulture), and speaking through this realization is termed
'metalinguistic awareness', the awareness oflanguage's semiotic character-
that it is a system of signification apart from the things it signifies).22 A noun-
based language necessarily gives a somewhat different view of the world than
a verb-based language, and perfect translations, as that 'gentle
deconstructionist' J B White shows, are impossible.23 In English one may say
'it's raining'; in Hebrew 'the rain is coming down'. In English 'it's hot', in
French 'it's doing hot', in Hebrew 'hot'. If we're talking differently about the
world - and we are - then we must be constructing different world-views as
we go. We may "inhabit each other's world" in communication to formidable
effects of sharing, but the prospect of a perfect, universal system of
representation and communication is just not there. Linguistic pluralism is
one thing, and enough of a challenge to communication. But a fragmentation
of the Kantian categories of reason - a plurality of irreducible and only partly
translatable world-views - seems a much more complex challenge to
communication. Diversity does not challenge communication on account of
faulty or imperfect competence, but as a matter of imbedded "linguistic
ideologies", the grammatical infrastructure that underlies every language.24
Some linguistic variances may indeed seem minor. But language is saturated
with content, and with ideological content at that. Every descriptive utterance
makes a claim, a response to the questions "what counts?" "what, of all the
possible ways to talk in any given context about any given state-of-affairs,
counts?" Kant's critique ofpure reason - the notion that knowledge is shaped
by necessary modes of cognition from which concepts emerge - was
21 See below n 31.
22 See Elizabeth Mertz & Jonathan Yovel, 'Metalinguistic Awareness' in The Handbook of Pragmatics,
Verschueren et aI, (eds), forthcoming 2001-2.
23 See James Boyd White, Justice as Translation: An Article in Cultural and Legal Criticism, Chicago, University
of Chicago Press, 1990.
24 See Michael Silverstein, 'Language Sttucture and Linguistic Ideology', in Paul R Clyne et aI, (eds), The
Elements: A Parasession on Linguistic Units and Levels, Chicago, Chicago Linguistic Society, 1979, p 193; also
Bambi B Schieffelin et ai, (eds), Language Ideologies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1998.
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universal: all rational agents shared reason's building blocks such as
causality, space, time, quantity, quality, number. Power and politics were
sidelined. But in a pluralistic world of interests, passions and power discourse
is shaped by contingent, not universal factors, and those are political
perforce. In different discursive contexts we ask, e g, who counts by default
as a paradigmatic person and who is alienated by standard linguistic
practices? Who gets to determine what the 'normal language', the standard,
correct linguistic approach is in different social contexts?25 Language has
become, instantly, political. Using language is no more merely a matter of
signification, a relation between a system of signs and signified 'things'. It is
that, too, but it is primarily a matter of communication and also of power. Of
communication because, as Jurgen Habermas put it in his dialogical notion of
'communicative ethics', an initial level of consensus and cooperation -
'inhabiting the other's world' and addressing her qua human - is required in
any linguistic exchange and is implied by the very act of talking to the other.
Meaning and performance are not analytical definitions of clear-cut 'sense
and reference'26 or performances of preordained 'procedures',27 respectively,
but ongoing, dynamic intersubjective practices: they are determined through-
and-by practice and linguistic exchange, not presupposed by them.
Nietzsche's 20th century heir, Michel Foucault, rejected Habermas'
notion and worked to examine the modes by which language-as-power is
both free of any 'discursive-ethical' presuppositions yet does not merely
respond to the social sphere, but shapes it. Discourse itself, Foucault and his
followers argued, is a shifting structure of power: who gets to speak? What
do we speak of, and how? What counts as knowledge?28 Whose voice counts
" I use 'normal language' as an ideologization, quite close to what Bakhtin termed 'general language'; see
Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, Michael Holkist ed, Caryl Emerson trans, Austin, University of
Texas Press, 1981; Mikhail Bakhtin & Pavel N Medvedev, The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A
Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics, trans. Albert Wehrle, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press,
1985.
26 According to Frege, these are the two components ofmeaning. See Wolfgang Carl, Frege's Theory ofSense and
Reference: Its Origins and Scope, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994.
27 This is how Austin thought of language's 'felicity conditions' of successful speech acts; see Austin J L, How To
Do Things With Words, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1962 and the discussion on performative
language, below.
28 This puts Francis Bacon's famous dictum, "knowledge is power" somewhat on its head. Power relations -
through discourse - frame what counts as knowledge.
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and how did it get its way? How do such classifications as between normality
and perversion, health and sickness, sanity and lunacy emerge in history, not
as a matter of language 'capturing' any "natural" distinctions but as a matter
of shaping and determining discourse in an eternal play of multiple power-
centres? The ideology of representation frequently obscures language's
manipulative functions and the ways in which it constructs itself: language
users appear to refer to and represent some 'transcendent' truths while
manipulating concrete contexts through the manifest (and often innocent, if
not entirely benevolent) representational claims.29 Language in Nietzsche and
in Foucault does not merely work within a presupposed cultural framework
but is the main agent through which the cultural framework is shaped in and
through history. Performativity - doing things with words -- thus gains a
wider scope, relating not merely to moves within a game, but primarily to
those which construct the tentative games and the consciousness that follow
from them. Representationalism becomes an agent of obscuring rather than
transparence: language performs through a semblance of representation of
non-linguistic realities. But us, if we take the linguistic turn seriously, do not
exist at all: realities are what language constructs and allows us to
acknowledge (this thesis was later expanded and made popular by Benjamin
Whorf and Edward Sapir, and is now labeled the 'Sapir-Whorf thesis').30
Epistemological idealism, relativised and somewhat turned on its head, has
found its performative agent as well as its engine: language frames reality
through a semblance of representationalism in an ironic play of power and
domination. The problem with language is not that it does not have the power
to represent things, but that its power is almost too strong: it constructs that
which is its object. But it is also an out-of-control cultural and political play
of masks. Some of the most significant work done by feminist, race and
critical, legal scholars aims at exposing domination: ideological biases and
29 According to Bourdieu, some institutions must obscure their true function in order to operate (eg, we think
about the awarding of gifts in certain societies as serving in what an observer may interpret - functionally, but not
symbolically - as an exchange.) See Pierre Bourdieu, An Outline ofa Theory ofPractice, Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press, 1977. Effective language-functions - such as certain types of performativity in their relation to
reference -- may require similar guises to operate (I thank Michael Silverstein for this insight).
30 See John B Carroll & Benjamin L Whorf (eds), Language Thought and Reality: Selected Writings ofBenjamin
Lee Whoif, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1964; Edward Sapir, Language: An Introduction to the Study ofSpeech, New
York, Harvest Books, 1955; see also John A Lucy, Language Diversity and Thought: A Reformulation of the
Linguistic RelatiVity Hypothesis, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
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political bents codified by supposedly neutral, procedural, or formal
language.
What, in turn, of legal language? For legal realists such as Oliver
Wendell Holmes language rests on what manipulates a legal agent - notably
a court - to act in a certain way. Whether language pretends to represent
something (such as legal doctrine) was useful, but that is not its specifically
'legal' usage: in court, claims of representation are one more mechanism of
manipulation. Which takes us away from representationalism and through
rhetoric to the most fascinating aspect of language, its use for 'doing' things
in the social world.
Perfonnadvity, Rhetoric, and Interpretation: TheLawyers' Language
All along the years, like a clandestine society guarding a secret
heritage, lawyers preserved the rhetorical paradigm while not fully professing
it. For in the histories of legal process, even when the judges of old were the
decision-makers who counted, the language belonged to the lawyers. All
lawyers ever do in courts of law is linguistic, and lawyers always thought of
language as being primarily a device for manipulating courts to distinct
courses of action.31 In the modem era the relations between players and
language in the legal game has shifted: language, through textualisation, to a
growing degree and in several key areas of practice, was seized by the judges,
as this class intensified its institutional production of canonical texts.32
Official court reporting came into the world, both co-existing with and
replacing the reports based on documentation by agents of commercial
publishing houses, as was the British custom of yore.33 In order to seize the
31 The Texas Law Review Manual on Usage and Style states that 'the only tool of the lawyer is words' (Foreward
to 2"" ed, 1967). The point is not whether this is correct or not, but that lawyers think of themselves in this way.
32 This description suits appellate and other non-jury procedures better; however, in jury trials judges, too, use
representational, rhetorical, and even performative language in instructing jurors. See below, text to notes 40 and
42.
33 The rise of law reporters was a recognized and documented process already in the 19th century. See Wallace J C,
The Reporters, Arranged and Characterized with Incidental Remarks, Soule and Bugbee, Boston, 1882; Daniel
W T S, The History and Origin ofthe Law Reports, W Clowes & Sons, London, 1884.
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language, lawyers must pass through the judges, must infiltrate textuality.
The principle itself is not new, only intensified: quite early in Western history
the legal canonical text ceased to be identified with the guild of Cicero's heirs
in favour of Sir Edward Coke's siblinghood ofjudges. Legal language, in the
generic form of the 'judicial opinion', made its appearance on the stage of
history 'as a text'. These texts we cannot understand by means of either
representationalism or rhetoric alone. They do not represent action, they are
the action; and they do not merely manipulate agents to act by way of
persuasion, they do so by constituting a validating reason for action, namely,
a command. The 'performative' paradigm gave both representationalism and
rhetoric such a twist as to alter them forever.
According to the performative paradigm the basic unit of speech is not
a such-or-such grammatical entity (such as a word or a sentence), nor is it
conceived in terms of meaning, whether according to semantic or pragmatic
or other approaches. Speech is as an 'act', and language is something you
'do' things with. Representing facts is one thing you can do, but you can also
promise, swear, assert, and otherwise constitute reality rather than merely
report it. When 1 say, in proper settings, 'meeting adjourned' or 'I name this
ship the Titanic' 1 do not represent a fact and 1 do not merely manipulate
others to act in some way; 1 create a fact in the world, a reason for action, in
Razian terms: the meeting is adjourned, a ship is named.34 These facts can
afterwards serve as reasons for action - the gatherers will go home, the
maritime agent will use the name for denotation - but that is generally true of
facts of the world. It is also true that as a by-product a speaker may
simultaneously report the act she is performing.35 Of course, that reality will
be of a peculiar nature, for you cannot - other things being equal - effect
nature in the comfortable way in which Joshua commanded the sun to stand
still over the endangered Giv'on. Barring magic - the radical performative
action that through the ages served many a legal function - the realm of
34 According to Raz, first-order reasons are facts that have a force to direct action, either considered or deliberately
ignored by decision-makers according to second-order reasons. Exclusionary rules (and, according to Raz, any
rule at all) are paradigmatic cases. See Raz J, Practical Reason and Norms, Hutchinson, London, 1975.
35 Thus Searle distinguished utterances' "propositional content" from their performative force: "Is the meeting
adjourned?" "the meeting is adjourned." "meeting adjourned!" "I propose to adjourn the meeting" all share a
propositional content - that of a meeting being adjourned - while performing different speech acts. See John
Searle, Speech Acts: an Article in the Philosophy ofLanguage, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969.
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perfonnative language is the social, nonnative world. Unlike the early
Wittgenstein's definition 'the world is the totality of facts' it appears that the
world consists of, if not things that are not facts, at least different classes of
facts, which include nonns. Note, that nonns are special in that there is an
important sense in which they are available to us only through language. But
that doesn't mean that they are 'just linguistic' entities. The laws ofnature are
also given to fonnulation only through language and, while these
fonnulations certainly are linguistic entities (such as the equations describing
gravity), nature itself is not. Nonns, too, exist in a non-linguistic sense: if you
owe me five dollars, that is a fact - a nonnative fact - even if its implications
depend upon the language that describes it. I will not renounce the debt if, in
the historical ways in which semantics changes, the phrase 'X owes Y five
dollars' will no more refer to an obligation ofpayment.
The Oxford philosopher J L Austin was the first to provide a more or
less comprehensive discussion of the perfonnative paradigm. According to
Austin's colourful tongue: When I say 'I do' (sic take this woman to be my
lawful wedded wife), I am not reporting on a marriage, I am indulging in it.36
Language thus conceived has a constitutive role in both manoeuvering in as
well as shaping, the social universe, and language users do things with
language somewhat like they do things in general. To promise, according to
the perfonnative paradigm, is akin to chopping a tree: these are both acts, and
both constitute facts: one a physical effect, the other a nonnative effect. Yet
there is an important difference, in that chopping a tree is not done with
signs, and arguably needs therefore no interpretation. Everything done with
language consists in manipulation of signs - phonetic, textual, body gestures
etc. - so the constitution of speech acts, unlike some other acts, is dependent
upon interpretation.37
What manner of perfonnance is interpretation? Let us take the inquiry
to a faraway, cool wood, where Peer Gynt has just returned to the solitary hut
36 Austin J L. 'Performative Utterances', in Philosophical Papers, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979
[1961], p 235.
37 Concerning both the illocutionary act (what manner of act was performed) and the locutionary (what does the
propositional content of the speech act - if there is one - mean?). In the following example both dimensions are
found to be interpretation dependent I) was there a performance ofa promise; 2) what was the promise about.
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after a day's labour (given Peer's tastes, this example appears to be a
counterfactual). Solveig greets him and asks how he has employed his time.
"Why, I've chopped down a tree", he answers, pointing to the object in
question which he barely manages to carry behind him. "Have not" - Solveig
indignantly replies - "I see no trunk, oidy branches and needles; this will
never do to warm our home in the chill of the night. Furthermore, it is yet
green and will not burn well. 'Tis not a tree at all." Peer is furious. "I never
knew you wanted it for burning, anyway", says the impractical youth. "But
you promised to bring a tree! Did you not utter the very words 'I'll be
bringing a tree when I come back'? Thus did you promise." "Aye, those
words I said, but that was merely an expression of my inclination on the
method of passing the time of the day, not a promise at all. And anyway, a
tree it is!".
Solveig and Peer do not agree on two things (at least). One, is whether
or not Peer has performed the act of delivering a 'tree'. The second is,
whether or not he committed himself to doing so by performing the speech
act of promising. They both agree that some distinct words were indeed said
(a 'rhetic' act, as it were), but for some reason that doesn't settle the issue. In
the matter of the tree, the word 'tree' seems important, but the agreement on
the word is not an agreement on meaning or on denotation. Solveig's act of
requesting a tree was made in a particular communicative context and for a
particular reason (in the sense of 'purpose' or 'interest' that needs be
promoted). In that context a tree must be something that burns lengthily, and
anything else is not a tree, the botanical dictionary be damned. Indeed,
Solveig 'relies on this context to do the work of constituting the meaning' of
her speech-act. Peer, ever engaged in daydreaming of grandeur and
distinction, missed that point. He is a forest man, and trees are those tall
evergreens which the forest holds in abundance. They are very pretty, Peer
thinks, and so he chops one down for embellishing their home. But the trunk
is but a colorless, heavy bulk. The branches, on the other hand, are beautiful
with their fresh green needles, and so he brings his tree home to Solveig, and
both will freeze for it at night.
What about the promise? I think that the interpretation of whether Peer
performed an act of promising or not should be approached in a similar
manner: that is, relying on communicative context to do much of the work of
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constituting the performative effect. The constitution of a speech act, thus,
cannot be wholly dependent upon the words employed, nor on the intentions
of the person who performs it. Like other acts, one may attempt to do one
thing, and in reality (fallible as we are) do the other: context does its work
whether we aim for it or not, correctly predict it or not. One might attempt to
promise, marry, curse, name a ship, say the truth or sing the Blues, yet fail.
The failure may be due to a speaker's incompetence or ignorance (e g,
making a wrong assumption about what singing 'the Blues' requires, or what
is true etc), yet many times a speaker will find that failures are due to an
interpretation she did not expect. That is because the interpretation does not
depend on her anymore. The outcome might be that, unwillingly, Peer has
indeed performed a different act than he promised to. That act is as real and
valid as any he may have intended. It seems that interpreting is activity very
much dependent upon context and conventions, and even when it 'does'
attempt to treat language as a representational device and uncover intentions
(as it may do but is not confined to doing), it is the outcome of the
interpretation that matters in social interactions, whatever the actual,
historical intentions were. Communication thus takes on a life of its own.
Moreover, the speech act interacts with its normative medium (which is the
relevant 'context' in the case of performatives) to produce a normative fact
(such as an obligation) or a state-of-affairs, arranged according to Hohfeldian
matrices. Indeed that is the manner in which the common law understands
speech acts. In the infamous case of Bardell v Pickwick, Dickens, with all his
mepris for the law, quite accurately captures his times' revolution in the law
of contracts, from a subjective 'meeting ofthe minds' rationalistic doctrine to
an interpretative, 'objective' one.38 This means that the formation of a
contract was no more subject to an inquiry ofmental states - "I did not intend
to promise", as Peer says - but to the conventional interpretation of the 'acts'
of the parties, and primarily their linguistic performances.
From promises let us move to the formation of contracts. Consider
Dickens' unhappy Mr Pickwick, entrapped in an outrageous lawsuit, one he
regards as completely absurd. We recall that it was brought by the matronly
J8 See Dickens C, The Posthumous Papers ofthe Pickwick Club, Chapman & Hall, London, 1837.
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widow Mrs Bardell for breach of an alleged promise of marriage. Such an
intention never crossed Mr Pickwick's mind, yet the ruling 'objective'
doctrine of contract formation does not, as a rule, ask whether it had. Note
that Mr. Pickwick's conduct in respect to Mrs Bardell was not the event that
constituted a legal obligation for him to pay her the £1,200 in damages that
he ended up dispensing with (to, as it turned out, the sole advantage of her
solicitors, the industrious Messrs Dodson and Fogg). This act was within the
scope of the 'court's' jurisdiction: Mr Pickwick's behaviour (for it can
scarcely be called 'action') created a 'reason' for the court to act the way it
did, a 'claim'. Dickens' sarcasm accurately describes that which it pinches:
the objective theory of contract formation, according to which the pivotal
question was whether Mrs Bardell was entitled to interpret Mr Pickwick's
actions as constituting a promise of marriage, which under the circumstances
as they appeared in court indeed seemed to be the case.
In the normative universe people generally have the power to create
certain types of norms - obligations and rights, etc (that is why contracts,
wills, torts etc, are usually classified as areas of 'private law' - not because
they deal distinctively with individuals, but because their ontology is of
discrete persons that are the source for norms, rather than one based on
positions of authority, such as a legislature, administrative agency or other
'public law' body). Let us be introduced to Ed, who at one time wishes to
present Susan with a gift, the wonderful Cezanne purchased in that auction at
Vince so long ago. Being a contemplative person he ponders the situation and
concludes that in some way he inhabits a position that enables him to change
several peoples' normative universes - their arrays of normative relations,
such as duties and rights - and to that he refers as a 'power'. For one thing, he
is about to give something away, thus renouncing any 'title' to it, and
creating rights concerning that object whose new bearers did not hold prior to
the act. Ed may decide to give away the coveted painting under condition that
it be exhibited some of the time at the local YMCA, and both Susan and the
YMCA will suddenly have rights and obligations they did not have before,
pertaining to the object, to each other, and to third parties. But there is
potential trouble: Susan may refuse to accept the gift, whether conditioned or
not, and thus exercise what we may term (following the legal theorist Wesley
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Hohfeld) an immunity from Ed's power of giving.39 Instead, she may offer to
buy it, or co-found a corporation to which it be transferred, in which she and
the museum will hold half of the shares save one each, and Ed will keep the
arbitrate on remaining two shares to decide possible disputes; and so on.
However, whatever they choose to do, they will do it with language. That
language does not represent action, it 'performs' it. Nor does it serve merely
as a rhetorical device to drive or motivate players to designated action. It does
not (or not merely) report or describe reality (cf the representational
paradigm) - nor used just as an instrument of persuasiveness, as a device for
manipulating others, themselves inhabiting positions of power, to act (cf the
rhetorical paradigm); rather, it primarily 'constitutes' reality. To be precise, it
will constitute realities of a specific nature: those of the social-normative
universe. It will hardly do for the chopping of trees (for that, the rhetorical
paradigm, as in language addressed to a woodchuck, is preferable) yet the
normative universe is as much a part of our reality as trees or woodchucks.
In litigation (which is not exhaustive of legal practices but only the one
most exposed to mass media), lawyers hold very restricted performative
powers in the sense described above. The genuine masters of the
performative functions of language are the judges, or juries, who use it within
the context of institutional power. Their language creates and unmakes
normative facts. While many things that matter to people happen in courts,
institutionally what matters primarily is the judicial or jury decision. To get a
piece of the cake, the lawyers resort to the rhetorical paradigm, and try to
manipulate judges and juries to apply their institutionally-mandated
performative language in accordance with the interests they represent. This is
far from the complete picture, because lawyers do possess some performative
powers, and judges and even juries both represent and persuade they instruct
juries or write for their multiple audiences (which may consist also of
appellate judges).4o Language is thus said to be 'multifunctional': it anchors
39 See Wesley N Hohfeld, 'Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in Judicial Reasoning', 26 Yale L J, 1917,
710; various editions were published in book form. The American Law Institute based the conceptual system of
the Restatement of Property (1936) on Hohfeld's conception ofproperty; see §§ 1-4.
40 In the USA juries may also produce texts, such as when they are asked to render a Special Verdict or a General
Verdict Accompanied by Answer to Interrogatories, FRCP R49(a) and R49(b), respectively. In the case of Special
Verdicts juries are required to "return only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each
issue of fact." In the case of General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to Interrogatories the court itself submits
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meaning, it performs, and it reflexively reaffirms and at times alters the
conventions of its own use and its own structure (a level denoted
'metapragmatic' by the linguist and anthropologist Michael Silverstein).41
Juries may also produce texts, such as when they are asked to render a
Special Verdict or a General Verdict Accompanied by Answer to
Interrogatories.42 In the former case juries are required to 'return only a
special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of
fact.' In the latter, the court itself submits written queries on matters of fact,
and 'direct[s] the jury both to make written answers and to render a general
verdict'. However, it is erroneous to consider the verdict as strictly
performative and the answer as wholly representational and rhetorical,
because in cases where the answer does not sit with the verdict - i e the
verdict obviously does not follow from the jury's own statement of fact - the
answers may control the verdict (as long as they are consistent among
themselves).
It is not surprising that in common-law cultures legal scholarship focuses
not so much upon the somewhat abstract concept of 'Law' as it does upon the
actual practices of the courts and other legal institutions. This approach, that
falls under the general heading 'legal realism' (it is one perspective of legal
realism, not the exclusive one) is perhaps still best represented by Oliver
Wendell Holmes, according to whom the 'Law' is not a code or a set of rules
but, essentially, no more than what the courts end up doing.43 The lawyers,
who always suspected if not overall believed this, see it as their business to
manoeuvre the courts - 'rhetorically' - to act - 'performatively' - in manners
agreeable to the interests they represent. Of course, the game has meta-
rhetorical rules (or strategies), a central one being that effective rhetoric
written queries on matters of fact, and "direct[s] the jury both to make written answers and to render ageneral
verdict". However, it is erroneous to consider the verdict as strictly perforrnative and the answer as wholly
representational and rhetorical, because in cases where the answer does not sit with the verdict - i ethe verdict
obviously does not follow from the jury's own statement of fact - the answers may control the verdict (as long as
they are consistent among themselves).
41 See Michael Silverstein, 'Metapragmatic discourse and metapragmatic function', in Lucy J A, (ed), Reflexive
Language: Reported Speech and Metapragmatics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p33.
42 See FRCP R49(a) and R49(b), respectively.
43 See Holmes 0 W, The Common Law, Little, Brown & Company, Boston, 1881.
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should mask as representational speech - that it be delivered in forms of
assertions about the law 'saying' or 'being' so-and-so, that the evidence
'shows' such-and-such, etc. That is one of the ways of rhetoric: it is not what
you say that matters, but what you achieve by saying it. The lawyers'
influence on the normative universe qua lawyers typically indirect - they
need to manipulate the holders of the institutional, performative power, who
are the courts. Their work is mainly rhetorical, and in this they are heirs to the
ancient sophists.
A schematic rendition of the lawyer's view of these linguistic
interactions can be presented thus:44
Figure 1
Speaker ------ {rhetorical manipulation}------~ Hearer/Agent--n---~Action
Litigant/ inter alia involving, or judge, jury, Performative in
lawyer masked as, parliament, respect to a
(and in jury reQresenta~ions: of facts, electorate, ~orr,nat~ve/
trials, judge) legal doctnne, moral etc. mstI~tlOnal
etc. argument, etc. medIUm
When Language Obscures Distinctions: Law in Social and Supernatural Contexts
Before concluding I wish to examine another deeply entrenched medium
for performative language, one that nevertheless concerns legal practices in
intriguing ways. For this let us go to Genesis 1, where the role of language
in the creation of the world is every bit as fascinating as the act itself and
44 This 'scheme' does not approach a different question, namely, the nature of the causal relation between
rhetorical advocacy and judicial performance. In jurisprudence, that question was dealt with to some extent by the
school known as 'Scandinavian Legal Realism'. See Olivecrona K. 'Legal Language and Reality'. in Newman E,
(ed), Articles in Jurisprudence in Honor of Roscoe Pound. Bobbs-Merill, New York. 1962, p 151. Nevertheless
this remains a fundamental riddle: what convinces people? For a powerful narrative approach to the question of
persuasion see Jackson B, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence, Deborah Charles Publications, Merseyside UK.
1988. See also Rose C, Property and Persuasion, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994.
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goes all the way back to the original and most radical act of creation - that
ofmaking being over nothingness through an utterance.
'And God said let there be light and there was light': What exactly did
the biblical God do when he pronounced his first and most radical fiat?45
How was it possible for him to use a word for light prior to the creation of
'light' before there was something for the word 'light' to refer to, not
temporally and contingently as a historical matter, but as a matter of
ontological impossibility? And why did God choose language, of all means at
his omnipotent disposal, to create a world by? Why didn't he just will it? And
what can be the relevance of this radical narrative to conceptions to such
apparently-distant linguistic performances as the practice of trial litigation,
forming contractual relations, and writing this text?
In the Biblical creation narrative the performative paradigm is
employed to break down the distinction - maintained above as crucial -
between the 'natural' world and the social, normative one. Is that a definition
of mystical action, the ability to blur distinctions by use of performative
language? Other puzzles demand our attention: 'God said' - why had he to
actually pronounce the words? What need for articulation to perform in the
service of an omnipotent will? Why was there a need for language at all?
After all, what the creator sought to perform was doing something (such as
chopping a tree), not saying something (such as talking about it or
manipulating someone to do it).
The world could not have been created by physical means because
physical mediums (such as space and time) and physical stuff (such as matter
and energy) are parts of the world, and these by definition did not exist prior
to creation. 'All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing
made that was made' (John 1:2). Existence there was - God existed - but as
what latter-day physicists may term by analogy a 'singularity', not as a
generally applicable principle. His was an act of radical creativity: he did not
form the world from pre-existing stuff, as several European myths narrate (eg
., The Biblical creation of light is rare, if not altogether unique, among myths of creation. The Biblical God does
not merely shape a world from a presupposed mess of existence, but creates existence. Separating the water and
the earth was also performed through a speech act (Genesis 1:6,7), but the earth and the water were, after a
fashion, already there. See discussion below.
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the Greek and the Norse ones) but created it over utter 'nothingness' save His
own existence. That is the radical aspect of Biblical creation, and the reason
that it cannot conceive of any means other than a pure act ofwill for creation.
And yet, puzzlements concerning the role of language appear to persist:
according to the Biblical narrative, the language of creating existed prior to
creation. 'The Word' - the divine principle later incarnated according to the
Christian narrative46 - was not the only thing that existed 'in the beginning,'
as the word or concept 'light' preceded the phenomenon. (However, didn't
the Biblical God create the concepts as weII?). Thus the word 'light' could
not have been accounted for by anything we understand by a theory of
reference, and according to radical creation it could not have a sense, either -
because as far as concepts can be said to 'exist' they too were not yet created.
(Platonism has answers to the latter difficulty - the atemporal existence of the
ideas independent from divine or human creation). Shouldn't we then put the
emphasis on 'let there be light'? Armed with our arsenal of talk about
language we now realize that this is not a puzzle that concerns representation
but performativity. The linguistic performance created the 'entity'. When
God 'said' (sic. 'let there be light') He did not 'talk' - the emphasis here is
not on articulation -- He acted. It was the performance of creation, not one of
reference or representation, that is the point of the first speech-act ever
uttered.47 Thus interpreting the Biblical narrative on its own terms requires
the hermeneutics of the performative paradigm of language, albeit applied
here to different realms then the social-normative one we usually associate it
with.
God lost the monopoly over blurring this distinction faster than you can
say Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Humans practiced magic from times
46 See John 1:1,1:14
47 As an aside, we may note that the problem of reference - the relation between words or language segments and
what they stand for, their 'referents' - so baffied linguistic philosophers as to become a predominant problem of
philosophical discourse. However, the scope of reference, it has been argued, is limited. The phrases 'the third
world war' or 'the king of France' currently have no referents, but they are not meaningless, because we
understand their sense even if we cannot point to a suitable referent to accommodate our conventions (see
Dummett M, above n 20 at p 116). Arguably, the performative paradigm proved fruitful in understanding
reference as well: the philosopher Saul Kripke (also Hillary Putnam, and P F Strawson before that) offered to
shift the emphasis from the relation between a 'type'-word and a class of referents to the question of how the
connection has been established, to the act that constituted it - a performance that underlines representation,
instead of the opposite. See Kripke S, Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1972.
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immemorial (and still do); and that is what magic is about: linguistic
manipulations that effect realms other than the social-normative ones. For
ashort while, let us play along with the uses of magic as manipulation of
power on this premise (that is, not as a mere superstition reducible to
psychological explanations). Certainly, we are more used to external points
of view that rationalise what some people refer to as magical practices. We
explain them in terms of psychology, sociology, politics, economics,
literature and so on.
Interpreting social practices is tricky - and magic is a social practice,
even if it presumes to involve natural and supernatural forces in those aspects
of human life that are generally understood as social. The interpretation of
social practices differs from understanding natural phenomena mainly in that
we attempt to understand something that is already interpreted by the
practitioners themselves (this is a point made by the philosopher Jiirgen
Habermas.). This doesn't mean that we must accept their views, but we must
realise that their interpretation is part of the phenomenon we examine.
On the rising slopes of Mount Kiliminjaro in Kenya lives the Chagga
nation. The anthropologist Sally Falk Moore recounts how, when a Chagga
person seeks justice from another (such as compensation for an injury or the
return of an object of contested ownership) she may go to a Kenyati civil
court, or to a local chiefs court, but she can also engage in a self-executing
procedure, which consists in casting a ritualistic malediction on her
antagonist. The curse is conditional: it will take effect unless the other party
redresses the wrong that the curse indicates. The linguistic formula consists
usually of calling upon spirits to avenge the wrongdoing. If the cursed party
has no blame, she will be immune to the spirits' malevolence, and could not
care less for the curse. If however she does consider herself subject to the
malediction she will most probably contact the maledictant and negotiate the
removal of the curse. The practice has a political dimension too: finding
recourse in magic and refraining from relying on an institutionalised court is
also an enhancement of one's autonomy and personal power, even an act of
defiance and sometimes resistance directed at institutionalised power. Among
the Chagga (although not everywhere where magical practices are used for
dispute resolution) not very much is needed to engage in ritual malediction.
The language is ritualistic, but the vocabulary, given the context, is rather
ordinary and every competent adult is capable of performing it (of course, to
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different levels of formidability). No 'professional' competence is necessary,
and so no lawyers are required.
The relevant point for our discussion is realising the centrality of
performative and rhetorical functions in 'legal' malediction. The rhetorical
paradigm is absent (according to the internal point of view), because the
'plaintiff so to speak, doesn't need to persuade anyone of the merits of her
case. Her antagonist, it is assumed, knows of her fault or innocence. (This
may be true, I think, only in rather simple disputes.). Nevertheless, a strong
rhetorical performance may intimidate and drive a person to consider the
risks she is taking by her opposition; it may be instrumental in negotiations
for compromise. Representationalism here takes a back seat, as producing
evidence while addressing the spirits is unnecessary, because unlike judges
they are omniscient and will not adhere by an unfounded claim.
Conclusion: Law and Language: ABeginning
The case of this discussion is the normative universe (of which law and
legal discourse are subsets). This means that as far as this discussion is
concerned normativity is the relevant phenomenon, irreducible to either
mental or linguistic constructions. If a person holds a right or claim to a
certain object, that in itself is a fact of the case as much as anything else
about that object - that it exists, that it is green, that circumstances exist that
do not allow that person to exercise her will in accordance with the extents of
the right she holds, etc. Rights are intersubjective facts - they depend on
discourse and emerge from it - but that is their nature qua normative facts,
not a reductive critique oftheir phenomenological status. Nevertheless, I fully
accept that communicative apparati and linguistic interactions (broadly
conceived) are the typical, if not sole, agents of action, in the normative
universe in general and in law in particular. How is this possible? How can
language be the medium through which phenomena that are not reducible to
linguistic terms are constituted and manipulated? Obviously, only a full,
intersubjective theory of performative language, freed from the confines of
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standard speech act theory, may address that concern - a project yet to be
undertaken.48
A main theoretical claim employed in this article is that the three
paradigms of language examined are aspects of language's
'multifunctionality', and that according' to all three, speech acts work in
dependence on the social context of their inception, which in tum constitutive
of their normativity. That is hardly a novel claim, although several studies of
legal language make it only in passing, neglecting to analyse what linguistic
'performance' exactly does in those contexts, concentrating almost
exclusively on different approaches to linguistic 'meaning'. The question
addressed here was, in what sense are rhetorical, performative, and
representational linguistic acts distinct, not morphologically but functionally,
i e, how meaningful legal language-segments perform in different modes
even though the performance cannot be attributed to single or distinctive
linguistic units alone - when speech acts are not so-called 'morphologically
differentiated' .
This article followed a phenomenological approach, according to which
linguistic paradigms are not mutually-reducible. Interesting efforts that follow
different strategies - e g, to ground performativity in representationalism (by
some philosophers) or in rhetoric (by some literary theorists) - are at best
brushed by here, not because they do not matter but because they respond to a
different question, namely 'what is it about language that allows for these
functional paradigms to work?' .49 No doubt, every scholar of language will
have chosen somewhat different sets of dilemmas and examples to discuss.
This article makes very modest claims as to what the proper canonical
components of the study of social language are. It uses discussions of
language to present three linguistic paradigms as aspects of language's
'multifunctionality', with perhaps some priority to performativity when social
48 An outline is provided in Jonathan Yovel, The Language Behind Law: an Inquiry ojLinguistic Peiformativity in
Legal Context, SID Dissertation, Northwestern University School of Law, Chicago, 1997.
49 I address that question summarily in Jonathan Yovel, 'What is Contract Law "About"? Speech Act Theory and
a Critique of "Skeletal Promises"', 94 Northwestern U L Rev (2000) 937. Function apart, very little is said here of
language's structure.
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action is considered.50 We saw that by 'performativity' we mean something
distinct enough to claim for its relative independence from rhetoric, yet that
'performativity' is intimately connected with normative media and with
interpretation, even when the basis for interpretation is not representational
(eg the fact of a promise v its content). Not less significant, language is
performative, but intentions or the will are not; and like any intentional action
language operates in the world in modes that mayor may not accord with the
intentions or will of its speakers. Even the omnipotent Biblical God did not
create a world merely by willing it, and resorted to speech acts. At least in
this we are made in his image - or He in ours.
Dr Jonathan Yovel
University ofHaifa
'0 Nowhere is it argued that these aspects are exclusive -- for instance, they do not include the emotive aspect and
do not explain poetics, as Jakobson justifiably demands from every theory of language. The failure to deal with
poetics is somewhat justified by the wish to confront only the most essential views on language in social action.
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